conducted by Dr. Martin Luther, 1483-1546
translated from the Latin text
WA 39/2, pp. 92-121
by Christopher B. Brown

The Theses
Theological Disputation

1. This is the catholic faith, that we confess one Lord Jesus Christ,
true God and man.
2. From this truth of the double substance and the unity of the person
follows the communication of attributes [communicatio idiomatum], as
it is called.
3. So that those things which pertain to man are rightly said of God,
and, on the other hand, those things which pertain to God are said of man.
4. It is true to say: This man created the world, and this God
suffered, died, was buried, etc.
5. But these are not correct in the abstract (as it is said) of human
nature [in abstractis humanae naturae].
6. For it cannot be said, Christ is thirsty, a servant, dead;
therefore he is thirst, servitude, death.
7. Wherefore this [statement] too is condemned: Christ is humanity,
even though it is said: Christ is divinity.
8. Even though man and humanity are otherwise synonyms, as are God and
divinity.
9. In the divine predicates or attributes there is not a difference of
this kind between the concrete and the abstract.
10. Even though both the scriptures and many fathers do not distinguish
between the concrete and the abstract in many predicates of human nature.
11. The Symbol [the _Te Deum_ ] proclaims, "When thou tookest man upon
thee to deliver him" [Tu ad liberandum suscepturus hominem], and Augustine
often does the same.
12. Although the normal way of speaking (as it seems) would be: "When
thou tookest humanity, or human nature upon thee to deliver it."
13. Thus some are not afraid to say: Christ is a creature, since
apparently it is said that Christ was created.
14. And John 1 says: "The Word was made flesh," when in our judgment
it would have been better said, "The Word was incarnate," or "made fleshly."
15. It is rightly taught, that in this matter the manner of speaking
preserved in the scriptures and in the orthodox fathers should prevail.
16. Or rather, many things are allowed even to the fathers who are
agreed to be orthodox, which we should not imitate.
17. Wherefore in this matter we should beware of etymology, analogy,
[logical] consequence, and examples.
18. Just as in grammar certain heteroclite nouns and irregular verbs
are not subject to etymology, analogy, or example.
19. And generally, in every sort of subject and art, practice often
dictates against the rule.
20. Nonetheless it is certain that with regard to Christ [in Christo]
all words receive a new signification, though the thing signified is the same
[in eadem re significata].
21. For "creature" in the old usage of language [veteris linguae usu]
and in other subjects signifies a thing separated from divinity by infinite
degrees [infinitis modis].
22. In the new use of language it signifies a thing inseparably joined
with divinity in the same person in an ineffable way [ineffabilibus modis].
23. Thus it must be that the words man, humanity, suffered, etc., and
everything that is said of Christ, are new words.
24. Not that it signifies a new or different thing, but that it
signifies in a new and different way [nove et aliter], unless you want to call
this too a new thing.
25. Schwenkfeld and his frog-and-mouse warriors [batarchomyomachis]
foolishly scoff [when we say] that Christ according to his humanity is called
a creature.
26. A man without learning [or] training, and moreover without common
sense, does not know how to distinguish between words with more than one
meaning [vocabula aequivoca].
27. For those who say that Christ is a creature according to the old
use of language, that is, by himself [separatam], were never Christians.
28. But rather everyone vehemently denies that Christ is a creature in
this way, which the Arians taught.
29. It is clear, therefore, that Schwenkfeld is barking into an empty
darkness [in vacuum chaos] against his own dreams of the creature in Christ.
30. And forgetting himself, the man concedes that God was made flesh,
though he has not yet dared to deny that flesh is a creature.
31. But Eutyches dwells hidden in such heretics, ready someday to deny
that the Word was made flesh.
32. They make a show of conceding that the Word was made flesh, ready
someday to deny it, when the theater is darkened, after it is denied that
there is a creature in Christ.
33. In these ineffable matters, therefore, this [rule] must be kept,
that we interpret the teachings of the fathers (as is necessary) in a suitable
way [commode].
34. It is wicked, when you know that the sense of someone's teaching is
Christian [pium] and sound, to make up an error out of words ineptly spoken.
35. For there were never any fathers or doctors who never spoke in an
improper way, if you want to scoff at their teachings.
36. [Coelius] Sedulius, the very Christian poet, writes: "The blessed
author of the world / Put on a lowly servant's form" [Beatus auctor seculi
servile corpus induit], and so through the entire church.
37. Although nothing more heretical could be said than that human
nature is the clothing of divinity.
38. For clothing and a body do not constitute one person, as God and
man constitute one person.
39. And yet Sedulius' thought was very Christian [piissime], as his
other hymns abundantly prove.
40. For the same reason that common saying would be heretical: The
whole Trinity worked the incarnation of the Son, as two girls dress a third,
while she at the same time dresses herself.
41. Thus certain scholastics, who think that the union [habitudinem] of
divinity and humanity is like the union [unioni] of form with matter, could
not be defended.
42. Others on the other hand [who think that] the union [habitudinem]
is similar to [the union of] matter to form, speak much more ineptly, if they
are strictly judged.
43. Nor could that [image] be maintained, in which the divinity is
compared to fire and the humanity to iron, even though it is a very beautiful
image.
44. Nor could that [image] be tolerated which Athanasius puts forward:
"As the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ."
45. For all deny that Christ is "composed" [of two natures] though they
affirm that he is "constituted."
46. But none have spoken more awkwardly [insulsius] than the
Nominalists [Moderni], as they are called, who of all men wish to seem to
speak most subtly and properly.
47. These say that the human nature was sustained or "supposited" by
the divine nature, or by a divine supposite.
48. This is said monstrously and nearly forces God as it were to carry
or bear the humanity.
49. But all of them think [sapiunt] in a correct and catholic way, so
that they are to be pardoned their inept way of speaking.
50. For they wished to utter something ineffable, and then every image
limps and never (as they say) runs on all four feet.
51. If [anyone] is not pleased by this or does not understand it, that
Christ according as he is a man is a creature [Christus secundum quod homo est
creatura], the grammarian consoles him.
52. Let him who has learned to discuss the same matter in various ways
be commanded to speak as simply as possible.
53. As the Ethiopian is white according to [secundum] his teeth, the
grammarian could speak otherwise thus: The Ethiopian is white with respect to
his teeth [albus dentibus], or "white of tooth" [alborum dentium].
54. But if this is unpleasing, let him say: The Ethiopian has white
teeth, or the teeth in the Ethiopian are white, or, most simply, the
Ethiopian's teeth are white.
55. Since in all these forms of speech the author wishes to signify the
same thing, it is useless to seek an argument over words.
56. Thus since these forms of speech--Christ according as he is a man
[secundum quod homo], or according to his humanity [secundum humanitatem], or
with respect to his humanity [humanitate], or by his humanity [per
humanitatem], or in his humanity [in humanitate]--mean nothing else than that
he has a creature or has assumed a human creature, or, what is simplest, the
humanity of Christ is a creature, the false logicians [pravilogicales] are to
be condemned, who give different meanings to different grammatical forms of
expression of the same matter.
57. Therefore heresy lies in meaning [sensu], and not in words, as St.
Jerome rightly said when he was provoked by his calumniators.
58. Otherwise Moses would be the greatest of heretics, for he recounts
the Decalogue itself in different forms in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5.
59. On the other hand, anyone with a wicked meaning, even if he shall
speak aptly and brandish the Scripture itself, is not to be tolerated.
60. For Christ did not permit the demons to speak when they testified
that he was the Son of God, as if they were transfiguring themselves into
angels of light.
61. Such is the simplicity and the goodness of the Holy Spirit, that
his agents [homines sui], when they speak falsely according to grammar, speak
the truth according to the sense.
62. Such is the craftiness and the wickedness of Satan, that his agents
[homines sui], while they speak truly according to grammar, that is, as to the
words, speak lies according to theology, that is, according to the sense.
63. Here it may be said: If you are lying, even in what you say truly,
you lie; on the other hand, if you are speaking the truth, even in what you
say falsely, you speak the truth.
64. This is what it means to be a heretic: one who understands the
Scriptures otherwise than the Holy Spirit demands.

The Disputation

Disputation of the Reverend Father Herr Doctor Martin Luther concerning the
divinity and humanity of Christ. In the year 1540, the 28th day of February.

Preface

The reason for this disputation is this, that I desired you should be supplied
and fortified against the future snares of the devil, for a certain man has
put forth a mockery against the Church. I am not so much troubled that an
unlearned, unskilled, and altogether ignorant man seeks praise and a name for
himself, as that the men of Lower Germany are troubled by his inept, foolish,
ignorant, unlearned, and ridiculous mocking. May you preserve this article in
its simplicity, that in Christ there is a divine and a human nature, and these
two natures in one person, so that they are joined together like no other
thing, and yet so that the humanity is not divinity, nor the divinity
humanity, because that distinction in no way hinders but rather confirms the
union! That article of faith shall remain, that Christ is true God and true
man, and thus you shall be safe from all heretics, and even from Schwenkfeld,
who says that Christ is [not] a creature, and that others teach falsely,
though he does not name those who teach wrongly. This is the malice of the
devil: he implicates us as well as the papists, but he names no one. If he
were to say such things to me, I would answer: You are lying, [when you imply
that] we say that Christ is not the Lord God. For our writings cry out in
answer [to your charge]. That wicked man perceives that he cannot survive if
he comes into the light, therefore he works secretly among women under secret
names [tectis nominibus]. But I am not troubled that he thus seeks to make a
name for himself and works secretly, but more by the fact that better
theologians are not moved by these frivolous calumnies to say to him: "You,
wicked man, are a liar! We do not say that Christ is merely a creature, but
that he is God and man in one person. The natures are joined personally in
the unity of the person. There are not two sons, not two judges, not two
persons, not two Jesuses, but because of the undivided union [unitam
coniunctionem] and the unity of the two natures there is a communication of
attributes, so that, what is attributed to one nature is attributed to the
other as well, because they are one person." If these [articles] are held
fast, Arius falls along with all heretics, but Schwenkfeld works secretly like
the tooth of the serpent, who bites secretly so that he cannot be accused.
Therefore we are now holding this disputation so that you may learn the
substance and manner of speaking [res et phrases] of Scripture and the
Fathers. It is an incomprehensible thing, such as not even the angels can
grasp and comprehend, that two natures should be united in one person.
Therefore, so that we may grasp this in some small measure, God has given us
patterns of speech [formulas loquendi]: that Christ is God and man in one
person, and there are not two persons, but two natures are united in one
person, so that what is done by the human nature is said also to be done by
the divine nature, and vice versa. Thus the Son of God died and was buried in
the dust like everyone else, and the son of Mary ascended into heaven, is
seated at the right hand of the Father, etc. We are content with these models
[formulis].
Finally, we must observe the manner of speaking [phrases] of the holy
Fathers. But if they have sometimes spoken ineptly [incommode], it is to be
rightly interpreted, not abused, as the papists do, who, having twisted the
words of the Fathers, abuse and allege them in defense of their idolatries,
purgatory, and good works, whereas [the Fathers] thought correctly concerning
these things, as many of their sayings testify with clearer and more apt
expression. St. Augustine indeed teaches much concerning good works in many
places and praises both good works and those who perform them. But in his
Commentary on the Psalms, he says, "Have mercy on me; that is, 'I shall be
troubled, but not troubled greatly, for I have trusted in the Lord.'" Here he
pleads none of those good works before God. And again in another place he
says, "Woe to man, however praiseworthy he may be, etc." Such is the sinful
and sacrilegious man who twists the correct sayings of the Fathers. But we
learn to agree with the sayings of the Fathers; or if we cannot agree with
them, we forgive them, for no man can be so wise that he does not sometimes
stumble and fall, especially in speaking, where it is easy to slip.
Schwenkfeld does not see this, and so when he hears the Fathers say that
Christ according to his humanity is a creature, at once he seizes on the
saying and twists it and abuses it for his own purposes. Even if the Fathers
say that Christ according to his humanity is a creature, this could in any
event be tolerated; but Schwenkfeld wickedly twists it: "Therefore Christ is
simply a creature." Why, wicked man, do you not add that Christ according to
his divinity is the Creator? Therefore he was created! But he does not add
this, because he says, "I can let my conscience be deluded in this way.
Therefore I have omitted it"--that is, I have done wickedly! He employs a
fallacy of composition and division. This is the hidden tooth of the serpent
and the true sacrifice of the devil among the papists as well. For they too
work secretly, twist the words of the Fathers, and omit those things which
seem to weaken their own cause, as Schwenkfeld also does. Before the learned
he deals deceitfully and seeks glory, but among his own he says: "Oh, what
wickedness of the papists, what blasphemies of the Lutherans! They say that
Christ is a creature, even though he was not created." This is [sheer]
wickedness rather than force or power [of argument]. He should have added,
that we say that Christ is a creature according to his humanity, and the
creator according to his divinity.

Schwenkfeld is to be refuted thus: Humanity is a creature. Therefore
Christ is a man and a creature. And then he says that the redeemer of the
human race cannot be a creature, sit at the right hand of the Father, etc., be
the seed of Abraham; but the consequence is to be denied.

Disputation
of Dr. Martin Luther against Schwenkfeld

I.

Argument: A human person is one thing, a divine person another. But in
Christ there are both divinity and humanity. Therefore there are two persons
in Christ.

Response: This is the fallacy of composition and division. In the major
premise you divide the human nature and the divine; in the minor premise you
join them. This is a philosophical solution; but we are speaking
theologically. I deny the consequence, for this reason, that in Christ the
humanity and the divinity constitute one person. But these two natures are
distinct in theology, with respect, that is, to the natures, but not with
respect to [secundum] the person. For then they are undivided [indistinctae],
but two distinct natures, yet belonging to an undivided person [indistinctae
personae]. There are not two distinct persons, but what is distinct is
undivided [sed sunt distinctae indistinctae], that is, there are distinct
natures, but an undivided person.

II.

Argument: Christ was not a man before the creation of the world. Therefore
it is not rightly said that the man Christ created the world. Or thus: When
the world was created, Christ did not create it as a man [tamquam homo].
Therefore it is not rightly said that a man created the world.

Response: There is the communication of attributes; and moreover [this is] a
philosophical argument. This stands: The natures are distinct, but after
that communication, there is a union, that is, there is one person, not two
persons. But that person is God and man, one and the same person, who was
before the creation of the world; even though he was not man born of the
Virgin Mary before the world, nonetheless he was the Son of God, who is now
man. Thus, for example, when I see a king in purple and crowned on his
throne, I say, "This king was born of a woman, naked and without a crown."
How can this be, and yet he sits on a great throne crowned and clothed in
purple? But these things he put on after he was made king, and yet
nonetheless he is one and the same person; and so too here in Christ God and
man are joined in one person and must not be distinguished. But it is true
that Christ created the world before he was made man, and yet such a strict
unity exists that it is impossible to say different things [of the divinity
and the humanity]. Therefore whatever I say of Christ as man, I also say
rightly of God, that he suffered, was crucified.

Objection: But God cannot be crucified or suffer.

Response: This is true, when he was not yet man. From eternity he has not
suffered; but when he was made man, he was passible. From eternity he was not
man; but now being conceived by the Holy Ghost, that is, born of the Virgin,
God and man are made one person, and the same things are truly said of God and
man [sunt eadem praedicata Dei et hominis]. Here the personal union is
accomplished. Here the humanity and divinity are joined [Da gehet's
ineinander humanitas et divinitas]. The union holds everything together [Die
unitas, die helt's]. I confess that there are two natures, but they cannot be
separated. This is accomplished by the union [unitas], which is a greater and
stronger union [coniunctio] than that of soul and body, because soul and body
are separated, but never the immortal and divine nature and the mortal human
nature [in Christ], but they are united in one person. That is to say,
Christ, the impassible Son of God, God and man, was crucifed under Pontius
Pilate.

Objection: Again, what is immortal cannot become mortal. God is immortal.
Therefore he cannot become mortal.

Response: In philosophy, this is true.

III.

Argument: God knows all things. Christ does not know all things. Therefore
Christ is not God.

I prove the minor premise from Mark, where Christ says that he does not
know the last day.

Reponse: The solution is that Christ there speaks after a human manner, as he
also says: "All things have been given to me by the Father." Often he speaks
of himself as if simply of God, sometimes simply as of man. The Father does
not will that the human nature should have to bear divine epithets [ut humana
natura debeat gerere dicta divina], despite the union, and yet sometimes
[Christ] speaks of himself as of God, when he says, "The Son of Man will be
crucified." To be crucified is a property of the human nature, but because
there are two natures united in one person, it is attributed to both natures.
Again, "Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life." There he speaks of the
divine nature. Or again, "They crucified the Lord of glory," where he speaks
of the property of the humanity.

IV.

Argument: A word is not a person. Christ is the Word. Therefore Christ is
not a person.

I prove the major premise, that a word and a person are different.

Response: This is a new expression, which was formerly unheard of in the
world. Christ is not a mathematical or physical word, but a divine and
uncreated word, which signifies a substance and a person, because the divine
Word is the divinity. Christ is the divine Word. Therefore he is the
divinity, that is, a substantial person [ipsa substantia et persona].
Philosophically, "word" means a sound or an utterance, but speaking
theologically, "Word" signifies the Son of God. This, Aristotle would not
admit, that "Word" signifies true God [plenum Deum].

V.

Argument: Christ beseeches the Father to hear him. Therefore he is not God.

I prove the consequence, for he who seeks to be heard, seeks the honor
of one who is superior.

Response: This is done because of the property of the human nature.

Question: It is asked, whether this proposition is true: The Son of God, the
creator of heaven and earth, the eternal Word, cries out from the Cross and is
a man?

Response: This is true, because what the man cries, God also cries out, and
to crucify the Lord of glory is impossible according to the divinity, but it
is possible according to the humanity; but because of the unity of the person,
this being crucified is attributed to the divinity as well.

V [b].

Argument: If Christ were true God, of the same essence with the Father, the
Scripture would not teach that he received all things from the Father. But
Scripture so says. Therefore he is not true God.

I respond to the minor premise: This [pertains to] his ministry and humanity.
For in divinity he is equal in power with the Father.

VI.

Argument: Everything that is born begins to be, or, everything that is born
has a beginning. Christ was born. Therefore he began to be. He is a
creature, and is not from eternity.

Response: I concede this, with a distinction. In philosophy this is true,
but not in theology. The Son is born eternal from eternity; this is something
incomprehensible. [But] this belongs to theology. For the Holy Spirit has
prescribed models for us; let us walk in that cloud.

VII.

Argument: When we must speak carefully, there is most need of grammar. In
theology, we must speak carefully. Therefore the Holy Spirit has his own
grammar.

Response: The Holy Spirit has his own grammar. Grammar is useful
everywhere, but when the subject is greater than can be comprehended by the
rules of grammar and philosophy, it must be left behind. In grammar, analogy
works very well: Christ is created. Therefore Christ is a creature. But in
theology, nothing is more useless. Wherefore our eloquence must be
restrained, and we must remain content with the patterns prescribed by the
Holy Spirit. We do not depart [from grammar] without necessity, for the
subject is ineffable and incomprehensible. A creature, in the old use of
language, is that which the creator has created and distinguished from
himself, but this meaning has no place in Christ the creature. There the
creator and the creature are one and the same. Because there is an ambiguity
in the term and men hearing it immediately think of a creature separate from
the creator, they therefore fear to use it, but it may be sparingly used as a
new term, as once Augustine spoke, moved by the greatest joy: "Is this not a
marvelous mystery? He who is the Creator, wished to be a creature." This is
to be forgiven the holy Father, who was moved by surpassing joy to speak thus.
He speaks, however, of the unity, not of a separation, as the grammar implies,
and yet, as I have said, this kind of speech is to be used sparingly, and our
joy must be restrained, lest it give birth to errors. And the Fathers are to
be forgiven, because they spoke thus because of surpassing joy, wondering that
the Creator was a creature. It is not permissible to use such words among the
weak, because they are easily offended, but among the learned and those firmly
rooted in this article, it does not matter how you speak, and I am not harmed
if you say: Christ is thirst, humanity, captivity, creature.

VIII.

Argument: Your fourteenth and eighteenth propositions are contradictory.
Therefore they are not to be approved.

Response: Such contradictions do not take place between equivocal terms, but
between terms of the same meaning. But "creature" has a double signification.

IX.

Argument: No creature ought to be worshipped [adoranda]. Christ ought to be
worshipped. Therefore Christ is not a creature.

Response: Thus Schwenkfeld argues. This is indeed one of his absurdities,
and he errs with respect to the communication of attributes. The humanity
joined with the divinity is worshipped; the humanity of Christ is worshipped,
and not falsely, for it is inseparable from the divinity and the addition of
this posessive, "of Christ," answers the objection. Thus Christ speaks in
John 14. Philip asks Christ to show him the Father, because with the eyes of
the flesh he sees nothing but flesh, and Christ then responds: "Have I been
with you so long, etc.? He who sees me, sees the Father." Christ says that
[Philip] sees the Father, when he sees [Christ], because he sees the humanity
and the divinity united in one person. Therefore he says, "Do you not know,
that the Father is in me and I in the Father?" Therefore it is said that he
who touches the Son of God, touches the divine nature itself. The old
theologians went to astounding lengths [mirabiliter se cruciarunt] in
answering this question of whether the humanity is to be worshipped, and they
established three ways [species] in which the humanity may be adored: Dulia,
when Peter and Paul and all the other saints are adored; hyperdulia, when the
Virgin Mary is adored, and here they included the humanity of Christ, and
called [this worship] hyperdulia as well; and latria, when Christ is
worshipped with regard to his divinity [cum relatione et divinitate]. Christ
clearly dissolves [the distinction, for] whoever worships the humanity of
Christ here no longer adores a creature (for this is what is meant by the
union of natures), but the Creator himself, for the unity is what is
fundamental [quia fundamentum est in unitate].

X.

Argument: Every man is corrupted by original sin and has concupiscence.
Christ had neither concupiscence nor original sin. Therefore he is not a man.

Response: I make a distinction with regard to the major premise. Every man
is corrupted by original sin, with the exception of Christ. Every man who is
not a divine Person [personaliter Deus], as is Christ, has concupiscence, but
the man Christ has none, because he is a divine Person, and in conception the
flesh and blood of Mary were entirely purged, so that nothing of sin remained.
Therefore Isaiah says rightly, "There was no guile found in his mouth";
otherwise, every seed except for Mary's was corrupted.

XI.

Argument: If Christ is a creature only according to his humanity, and is not
called a creature _simpliciter_, then it follows that something remains which
is not united in Christ by nature [manere quod non uniatur in Christo natura],
and that there is in Christ something which is not divine.

Response: There is an equivocation in the term "_simpliciter_." It is
impossible that Christ is merely a creature according to his humanity, for
this destroys the divinity. This is Schwenkfeld's objection. Christ is not a
creature _simpliciter_. Christians indeed say that Christ according to his
humanity is a creature, but they immediately add that Christ according to his
divinity is the Creator, etc. Therefore the human nature is not to be spoken
of apart from the divinity. The humanity is not a person, but a nature.

XI [a].

Argument: No one can dispute that flesh is a creature. Christ was made
flesh. Therefore he is a creature.

Response: With respect to his humanity [ad humanitatem] Christ was made
flesh.

XI [b].

Argument: Whatever is subject to death, is not God. Christ was subjected to
death. Therefore he is not God.

Response: Because of the communication of attributes, this thing which is
proper to the human nature is shared [commune] with the divine.

XII.

Argument: "Man" and "humanity" have the same meaning. Therefore it is
rightly said that Christ is humanity.

Response: This is not conceded, but rather that Christ is man, because this
is a concrete term with personal signification, whereas an abstract signifies
the mode of nature, or naturally, so that therefore it is false that Christ is
human nature, that is, humanity, or that Christ is humanity. Aristotle says
that abstract terms refer to nature, and concrete terms to a person.

XII [a].

Argument: Whatever belongs [inest] to something, can be predicated of it.
Humanity belongs to Christ. Therefore Christ is humanity.

Response: To "belong" is to inhere to a subject. Whiteness inheres to John.
Therefore John is whiteness. But this does not follow in the abstract. But I
concede it in the concrete: Whiteness inheres to John, therefore he is white.
Humanity belongs to Christ, therefore he is a man.

XIII.

Argument: Paul says: Christ was made a curse. Therefore by the same
principle it could be said: Christ was made humanity.

Response: Rather than analogy, we must follow the guidance of the Holy
Spirit, and as he himself prescribes, so we must speak. That Christ was made
a curse for us, there signifies something truly concrete, that is, Christ was
made a sacrifice, a victim for us.

XIV.

Argument: The manner of speaking [idioma] used by Holy Scripture must be used
by us rather than any other. Scripture never says: This man created the
world; God suffered. Therefore we ought not to speak thus.

Response: The question is whether certain forms of speech [formae] of the
Fathers are to be retained apart from Scripture. I answer, that it is
permissible to use them, when they do not disagree with Holy Scripture in
meaning. For error lies not in the will, but in the meaning. When there are
words which produce error, they must be avoided; but if they give no occasion
for error, it does not matter if you say "a man created the world," if only
the meaning is sound.

XV.

Argument: Moses says, "The Lord your God is one God." Therefore Christ
cannot be true God.

Response: What Moses says, that God is one, in no way contradicts us. For we
too say that there is one God, and not many, but that unity of substance and
essence has three distinct persons, as the nature[s] of Christ are united in
one person. When therefore it is said that "the divinity died," then it is
implied that the Father too and the Holy Spirit have died. But this is not
true, for only one person of the divinity, the Son, is born, dies, and
suffers, etc. Therefore the divine nature, when it is take for a person, was
born, suffered, died, etc., and this is true. We must therefore make a
distinction. If you understand by "divine nature" the whole divinity or the
unity, then the assertion is false, because Christ alone is not the whole
Trinity, but only one person of the Trinity. Therefore there is only one God.
Here we preach, insofar as it is possible, that these three persons are one
God and one essence. But we believe that these things are incomprehensible;
if they could be comprehended, there would be no need to believe them.

XVI.

Argument: Whatever consists of soul and flesh is a creature. Christ consists
of a soul and flesh. Therefore he is a creature.

I prove the major premise from the Athanasian Creed.

Response: Christ does not consist of a soul and flesh, but of humanity and
divinity. He assumed human nature, which consists of soul and flesh, and in
the Creed, man must be construed with rational soul.

XVII.

Argument: There is nothing accidental in God. To assume humanity is an
accident. Therefore Christ is not God.

Response: In philosophy this is true; but in theology we have our own rules.
When we portray the union so that the divinity in Christ is as it were a
substance, but his humanity as it were an accidental quality, like whiteness
or blackness, this is not said properly or aptly, but we speak thus so that it
can be understood in some way. But that unity of the two natures in one
person is the greatest possible, so that they are equally predicated, and
communicate their properties to the person, as if he were solely God or solely
man.

XVIII.

Argument: Only God is good. Christ does not wish to be called good.
Therefore Christ is not God.

I prove the minor premise from Matthew 19: "Why do you call me good?
No one is good, but. . .," etc.

Response: Christ speaks there according to the capacity of the man asking the
question: "You say that I am good, and yet you do not believe that I am God.
Therefore you do not rightly call me good." Or thus: Christ wished to speak
according to his humanity.

XIX.

Argument: Propositions 15 and 16 are contradictory. Therefore they cannot be
true.

Response: The Fathers sometimes erred [labantur] in judgment, and sometimes
speak correctly. Therefore we must not change them everywhere. Thus Bernard
sometimes spoke very ineptly and improperly, as if he were a heretic. But
when a serious matter was at stake, and he was speaking with God, then [as if]
he were Peter or Paul himself. Therefore the Fathers are to be imitated where
they have spoken and thought rightly, but where they have spoken or even
thought improperly, they are to be tolerated and properly interpreted, as the
papists do who force even [the Fathers] to come to their opinion.

XX.

Argument: The same thing cannot be predicated of God and man. Therefore,
etc.

Response: This is a philosophical argument. There is no relation between the
creature and the Creator, between the finite and the infinite. But we not
only establish a relation, but a union of the finite and the infinite.
Aristotle, if he had heard or read this, would never have been made a
Christian, for he would not have conceded this proposition, that the same
relation belongs to the finite and the infinite.

XXI.

Argument: If it is rightly said that Christ is thirsty and dead, it is also
rightly said that he is thirst and death, for it is said in the Psalm itself:
"I am a worm, and scorn, and despite," and not "I am scorned." Therefore by
the same principle, it seems that it should be said that Christ is death and
thirst.

Response: Analogy or etymology does not hold here. And as I have said, we
must retain the patterns prescribed by the Holy Spirit, especially among the
weak; among strong Christians, it does not matter how you speak, as before me,
since I am not still being taught such things, being already acquainted with
them. [But] among those who are to be taught, we must refrain. As long as
the heart does not err, the tongue will not err; our stammering has been
approved by the Holy Spirit. But among those who are to be taught, we must
speak modestly, properly, and aptly.

XXII.

Argument: If that which is worse is said of Christ, so too must that which is
better be said. Death is better than sin. Therefore if Christ is called sin,
he is even better called death.

Response: The analogy does not hold. Those who teach are given the task of
teaching aptly, properly, and clearly, so that they may capture their hearers,
who are otherwise offended. He who knew no sin was made sin, that is,
captivity, damnation.

XXIII.

Argument: The Nicene Creed is undoubtedly [maxime] catholic. The opinion of
Schwenkfeld agrees with the Nicene Creed. Therefore it is true.

I prove the minor premise, because it is said [in the Creed] that Christ
is begotten, not made. But every creature is made. Therefore Christ is not a
creature.

Response: "Begotten" refers to the divinity, but Schwenkfeld confounds the
two natures.

XXIV.

Argument: Paul says that Christ was found in condition [habitu] as a man.
Therefore the humanity in Christ is an accident; that is, Christ is man
accidentially, and not by virtue of substance.

Response: The Greek term is _schema_, that is, figure, form, or bearing, that
is, "condition" signifies that he walked and lay down like any other man.
Paul wishes to demonstrate that he was a true man, who suffered and spoke as a
man. Propositions concerning the accidents of man and God in Christ are
immodest [non sunt castae], therefore they are to be spoken of sparingly, and
we must take our stand on the unity. This is so closely joined that in the
whole nature of things no similar example can be given. The closest
similarity is the nature of man. For as this consists of two distinct parts,
that is, soul and flesh, thus the person of Christ consists of two natures
united, although the soul is at last separated from the flesh when man dies.

XXV.

Argument: (M. Vitus Amerbach) I ask the reason why Christ is man and not
humanity.

Response: Because "man" includes the person, and "humanity" does not.

I now argue the point thus: Man is humanity; either they are synonyms
or they are not. If they are synonyms, the seventh proposition is false,
whence the proposition that Christ is humanity is condemned, even though it is
said that Christ is divinity.

[Again:] If it is not false, then the eighth proposition is invalid: "Though
otherwise man and humanity are synonyms, like God and divinity."

Response: Synonyms are predicated interchangeably of the same substance, for
such is the nature of synonyms. If they are synonyms, they must be predicated
of the same subject. They are called synonyms becayse they signify the same
thing _simpliciter_ in all respects. Thus man and humanity are synonyms
_simpliciter_ in philosophy, but in theology they are not.

Against the solution: Synonyms are of the same nature and signification. Man
and humanity are not of the same nature. Therefore they are not synonyms.
You [vos] have said that humanity signifies only a form in matter, not joined
with a subject. But man is a subject. Therefore they are different.

Response: In philosophy they are synonyms _simpliciter_, having the same
signification, but not in theology, for here is one man to whom no one is
similar. Here man in the concrete signifies human nature, because he is a
person, but humanity does not signify a person. Therefore [these terms]
differ in theology and philosophy. If it were said that the divine person
assumed a man, that is, a human person, it would follow that there were two
persons, but this is intolerable. Therefore it is rightly said that the Word
assumed human nature.

[Again:] "Thou tookest man upon thee to deliver him."

Response: Man is taken in an abstract sense. "Man," when it is said of
Christ, is a personal name, now that the person has assumed the person.

XXVI.

Argument: I ask whether a holy thing and holiness, or a good thing and
goodness, are the same?

Response: There is a great difference between concrete terms and abstract
ones, as between a white thing and whiteness, between substance and accident.
These are not synonyms, for a accident can either be present or absent.

On the contrary: Both a good thing and goodness are accidents, as are a man
and humanity.

Response: As far as accidents are concerned, they are not synonomous.

XXVII. Against [propositions] 11 and 12.

"Thou tookest man upon thee to deliver him." But strictly speaking [proprie],
God either assumed human nature or humanity or man. But strictly speaking he
did not assume humanity or human nature. Therefore he assumed a man, because
humanity is an abstract and signifies only a form, but human nature signifies
matter, that is, flesh and soul. But God strictly speaking did not assume
flesh and a soul, nor flesh alone or a soul alone, but a man, which is the
general and most appropriate term in this matter. Therefore I say that he
assumed a whole man [integrum hominem], not simply humanity or a part thereof.

Response: When humanity is used, as above, as a philosophical term, it is the
same as man, but in theology it does not signify a person, as "man" signifies
a person, that is, a particular person, [if we were to say] that the Son of
God assumed a man. If it were said that the divine person assumed a human
nature, that is, a person, then there would be two persons, which we do not
concede. For there are not two substances, etc.

"Thou tookest man upon thee to deliver him." Here everyone answers that
man is here taken abstractly, that is, as "humanity," which is not subsistent,
but assumed. "Man," however, does not signify something assumed, but an
existing person. Therefore "man" has a different signification with regard to
Christ. Christ is a man, that is, the divine person which assumed human
nature, for the person did not assume a person. In philosophy there is no
difference between man and the union of a soul and flesh, but in theology
there is a great difference. For in Christ, humanity signifies the assumed,
not subsistent, human nature. But "man" signifies a subsistent person.

XXVIII.

Argument: Just as it is rightly said that Christ is created, so too it is
rightly said that Christ is a creature. "Creature" [creatura] does not
signify an action, but a thing produced by a creator, but it is nevertheless
an abstract term.

Response: We concede to the Fathers, after their fashion, that christ is
called a creature; but because among the untrained "creature" always signifies
something separated fron the Creator, this is not well done. But when we call
Christ a creature, we understand the divine person which assumed human nature.
Nor is the creature in Christ the subject [suppositum], not even according to
philosophy, but something assumed. Christ, being created, is not separated
from God. Therefore he is not a creature in the old sense of the word.

XXIX.

Argument: Two contraries cannot exist in the same subject [duo disparata non
possunt esse in eodem]. God and man are contraries. Therefore they cannot
exist in the same subject.

Response: Christ was corruptible and mortal, because he died, but not
according to his birth [secundum generationem]. Aristotle did not understand
the corruption of human nature, wherefore he attributed our corruption to the
elements, as in other created things. But the fall of Adam is the cause of
death. For Adam was composed of the elements, [and yet] intended [conditus]
for eternal life. If he had not fallen, there would have been a perpetual
harmony of the elements and no corruption.

XXX.

Argument: Athanasius says: Such as is the Father, such is the Son.
Therefore Christ is not created.

Response: He speaks of the divinity of Christ, [but] the Word, which is God,
became incarnate.

XXX [a].

Again: Contraries must be eliminated [contraria sunt e medio tollenda]. Your
third and sixth propositions are clearly contrary. The third states that
those things which pertain to man are rightly said of God, and those things
which pertain to God, of man. The sixth, that it is not permissible to say
that since Christ is thirsty, a slave, dead, therefore he is thirst, slavery,
death. Therefore these propositions must be eliminated.

Response: In the third proposition we are speaking in the concrete, but in
the sixth in the abstract.

Again: This is the catholic faith, that we confess one Lord Jesus Christ,
true God and man. Therefore, neither God the Father nor the Holy Spirit,
since "one" excludes both God the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Response: One God, and threefold [trinum] in Trinity, nor do we deny the
Trinity. For there is one God, but three persons, nor yet are they separated
from each other.

Again: The Word was made flesh. But flesh is a creature. Therefore the
Word, that is, God, was made a creature.

Response: John says concerning Christ that he was made flesh, that is, that
he assumed human nature, while otherwise he remained God.

Again: They think rightly who say that Christ is [not] a creature according
to his humanity, as Schwenkfeld.

Response: They are all wrong who call Christ a creature _simpliciter_.

XXXI.

Argument: God is a spirit. Christ is not a spirit. Therefore, etc.

Response: In Christ there are two natures: the divine, which is spirit, and
the human, which has flesh and bones. Christ according to his humanity is a
creature, and Christ according to his divinity is God, so closely joined
together [coniunctissime etiam] that the two natures are one person.

XXXII.

Argument: He who makes something cannot be the same as the thing which he
makes. Christ is the Creator. Therefore he cannot be a creature.

Response: We join the Creator and the creature in the unity of the person.
The worthless Schwenkfeld [reproaches] us for teaching that Christ is only a
creature. He wants to be holy when he stirs up that sect and says that Christ
in glory is not a man. Therefore neither will he be God or worthy of worship.
He means a pure creature apart from the divinity. He reproaches good men
without naming them. None say, as you claim, that Christ is purely a
creature, but a serpent is easily hidden.

XXXIII.

Argument: The divinity in Christ felt no pain. God is divinity. Therefore
he did not feel pain on the Cross, and consequently he did not suffer.

Response: [Because of] the communication of atributes, those things which
Christ suffered are attributed also to God, because they are one. Our
adversaries want to divide the unity of the person, but we will [not] concede.
We join or unite the distinct natures in one person.

XXXIII [a].

Argument: Whatever is subject to death, is not God. Christ was subjected to
death. Therefore Christ is not God.

Response: [First,] there is the communication of attributes, and the argument
is a philosophical one.

[Again:] Scripture does not say: "This man created the world; God suffered."
Therefore these expressions are not to be used.

Response: Error resides not in words, but in the sense; although Scripture
does not put forward these words, it nevertheless has the same sense.

XXXIII [b].

Argument: No creature creates. Christ is a creature.

Response: [This is true] understanding creature in a philosophical way. But
creature is said of Christ theologically. Christ is the Creator.

Again: Paul [writes] to the Galatians: God sent his Son, born of a woman.
Therefore God is a creature.

Response: The argument is true according to the humanity.

End [of the Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ]

_________________________________________________________________

This text was translated from the Latin for Project Wittenberg by
Christopher B. Brown and is in the public domain. You may freely
distribute, copy or print this text. Please direct any comments
or suggestions to: Rev. Robert E. Smith of the Walther Library at
Concordia Theological Seminary.

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